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BALLOT REFORMS 2016: THE RAMIFICATIONS ON 
PROBABLE CAUSE IN MASSACHUSETTS WITH LEGAL 
MARIJUANA CULTIVATION IN THE HOME 
Jacob T. Winniman 
2016 was a monumental year for state sovereignty regarding 
marijuana regulation.  A total of nine states voted on marijuana 
reforms, with five deciding whether to legalize recreational use.  
Among them, Massachusetts voters came together in a display of 
democracy to end their decades long prohibition on recreational 
marijuana possession, distribution, and cultivation with a “Yes” on 
Question 4.  By doing so, Massachusetts, as well as California, 
Alaska, and Nevada, joined the four other states in the Union to have 
legalized recreational marijuana, Colorado, the District of Columbia, 
Oregon, and Washington.  As Massachusetts implements their 
marijuana reform, law enforcement faces a familiar but problematic 
dilemma.  Question 4 legalized the personal cultivation of twelve 
marijuana plants in a home, but limited processing to six mature 
plants.  Law enforcement is now presented with the question: what is 
sufficient probable cause to obtain a search warrant for illegal 
marijuana cultivation in Massachusetts in light of Question 4? 
This Note will introduce and explore the background and status of 
marijuana laws in the country and the recent reforms of 2016.  Then, 
it will analyze and compare what constitutes sufficient probable cause 
to obtain a warrant to search a home in Massachusetts and Colorado 
for suspected illegal marijuana cultivation in light of recreational 
reforms.  Finally, this Note proposes that Massachusetts should look 
inward for guidance and rely on local precedent to determine 
sufficient probable cause to obtain a search warrant for suspected 
illegal marijuana cultivation. 
 
  Candidate for J.D., Western New England University School of Law, 2018; B.A., 
Criminal Justice, George Washington University, 2014.  This Note is dedicated to my late 
father, Steven L. Winniman, for inspiring me to pursue a career in criminal law.  I am deeply 
grateful for my mother, Rose Cabrera, and sisters, Aviva Winniman and Paloma Cabrera-
Lustig, for their never-ending love and support.  Finally, I would like to extend my sincerest 
gratitude to the staff of the Western New England Law Review for all the tireless effort and 
work put into this piece. 
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INTRODUCTION 
When law enforcement seeks to search a property for suspected 
illegal behavior in the United States, they must normally obtain a search 
warrant.1  To apply for a warrant, law enforcement must submit an 
affidavit that provides sufficient information for a detached and neutral 
magistrate to decide whether, based on the four corners of the affidavit, 
probable cause exists that the suspect has or is committing a crime.2  
Before the passage of the Humanitarian Medical Use of Marijuana Act 
(HMUM) in 2012,3 which legalized some forms of marijuana cultivation 
in the home, Massachusetts law enforcement could obtain a search 
warrant upon a showing of probable cause that any marijuana was being 
cultivated on a property.4 
In 2016, Massachusetts voters decided to expand the legalization of 
marijuana to include recreational use.5  Question 4 (the Massachusetts 
Marijuana Legalization Initiative) appeared on the 2016 ballot proposing 
 
1.  See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 701 (1983) (The Fourth Amendment 
generally prohibits a seizure “unless it is accomplished pursuant to a judicial warrant issued 
upon probable cause and particularly describing the items to be seized.”). 
“The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by zealous 
officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual inferences 
which reasonable men draw from evidence.  Its protection consists in requiring 
that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of 
being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting 
out crime.  Any assumption that evidence sufficient to support a magistrate’s 
disinterested determination to issue a search warrant will justify the officers in 
making a search without a warrant would reduce the Amendment to a nullity and 
leave the people’s homes secure only in the discretion of police officers. . . .” 
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 449 (1971) (quoting Johnson v. United States, 333 
U.S. 10, 13–14 (1948) (emphasis added)). 
2.  See Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 450 (holding that a search warrant for a vehicle was 
invalid because it was issued by the state attorney general, not by a neutral and detached 
magistrate); see also U.S. CONST. amend. IV (requiring that warrants may only be issued upon 
a showing of probable cause).  “Probable cause exists where ‘the facts and circumstances 
within [the arresting officers’] knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy 
information [are] sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief 
that’ an offense has been or is being committed.”  Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 313 
(1959) (alteration in original) (quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925)). 
3.  An Act for the Humanitarian Medical Use of Marijuana, 2012 Mass. Acts ch. 369, 
https://malegislature.gov/Laws/SessionLaws/Acts/2012/Chapter369 [https://perma.cc/52RZ-
URPL] [hereinafter HMUM]. 
4.  See Commonwealth v. Allard, 642 N.E.2d 307, 307–08 (Mass. App. Ct. 1994) 
(holding that where a police officer observes marijuana plants growing outside in a garden, 
there exists sufficient probable cause to search the property for related illegal materials). 
5.  Joshua Miller, Mass. Voters Say ‘Yes’ to Legalizing Marijuana, BOSTON GLOBE 
(Nov. 8, 2016), https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2016/11/08/pot/
nn0rImK95SxMkC9Y0GaKsI/story.html. 
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to regulate and tax marijuana in a way similar to alcohol.6  In 2008, 
Massachusetts voters decriminalized marijuana,7 and legalized medical 
marijuana in 2012.8  Both decriminalization and medical marijuana 
passed with over sixty percent of the vote.9  Question 4 proposed to 
legalize personal cultivation of twelve marijuana plants—limited to six 
mature marijuana plants—in a private home, adding to the complexity of 
a probable cause analysis.10  On November 8, 2016, a majority of 
Massachusetts residents voted in favor of legalizing recreational use of 
marijuana, turning the ballot initiative into law.11  Between the passage 
of HMUM and the newly enacted legislation in The Act, Massachusetts 
stepped into uncharted territory regarding legalized personal marijuana 
cultivation.12 
 
6.  See generally The Regulation and Taxation of Marijuana Act, 2016 Mass. Acts, ch. 
334, https://malegislature.gov/Laws/SessionLaws/Acts/2016/Chapter334 [https://perma.cc/
QA7J-B7RJ] [hereinafter The Act].  See also Hensley v. Att’y Gen., 53 N.E.3d 639, 654–56 
(Mass. 2016) (deciding the precise language and how Question 4 would appear in a non-
misleading way on the ballot in November).  The Massachusetts Marijuana Legalization 
Initiative is referred to as “Question 4” because it appeared as the fourth question on the 2016 
ballot.  Mass. Ballot Questions, BOS. GLOBE, (Nov. 16, 2016 11:20 PM), 
http://www.bostonglobe.com/elections/2016/MA/Question. 
7.  MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 94C, § 32L (2018). 
8.  HMUM, supra note 3. 
9.  Ken Belson, Election 2012: Massachusetts, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 9, 2012), 
http://elections.nytimes.com/2012/results/states/massachusetts.html (noting that 63.3% of 
registered Massachusetts voters voted “Yes” to decriminalize the medical use of marijuana); 
John Schwartz, Election Results 2008: Massachusetts, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 9, 2008), 
http://elections.nytimes.com/2008/results/states/massachusetts.html (noting that 65.2% of 
registered Massachusetts voters voted “Yes” to decriminalize marijuana). 
10.  The Act, supra note 6, at sec. 5, § 7.  The Act created a fine line between legal and 
illegal personal marijuana cultivation.  See id.  Specifically, six mature plants are legal but 
seven mature plants are illegal; a total of up to twelve plants are legal but thirteen plants are 
illegal.  Id.  There is no guidance in The Act regarding sufficient probable cause to support the 
issuance of a search warrant for illegal marijuana cultivation.  See generally id. (the terms 
“probable cause” and “warrant” do not appear in the text of The Act). 
11.  Mass. Ballot Questions, supra note 6 (noting that 1,745,945 (53.6%) of registered 
Massachusetts voters voted “Yes” on Question 4 while 1,513,304 (46.4%) voted “No”).  In 
Massachusetts, a ballot initiative may become law after it is voted on without executive 
approval 
[i]f it shall be approved by voters equal in number to at least thirty per cent of the 
total number of ballots cast at such state election and also by a majority of the 
voters voting on such law, it shall become law, and shall take effect in thirty days 
after such state election or at such time after such election as may be provided in 
such law. 
MASS. CONST. art. XLVIII, pt. V, § 1 (2018) (emphasis added) amended by MASS. CONST. 
art. LXXXI, § 2.  The Act took effect on December 15, 2016, thirty days after it was voted on 
and became law.  The Act, supra note 6, at sec. 12. 
12.  Compare The Act, supra note 6, at sec. 5, § 7 (legalizing the personal cultivation of  
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Since probable cause has not been extensively analyzed with legal 
recreational marijuana, Massachusetts may face difficulties in its 
implementation of the voter’s will against the often proactive and 
zealous duties of drug related law enforcement.13  Specifically, 
Massachusetts courts and law enforcement will need to address 
uncertainty regarding the protection of private residences from 
unreasonable searches and seizures, as it is now legal to cultivate a 
limited amount of marijuana in the home.14  Additionally, as the 
regulation is specific as to the limited number of plants allowed for 
cultivation, proper procedures and clear guidelines are important to 
ensure Massachusetts law enforcement make a smooth transition to 
marijuana legalization.  As the law is currently structured, a gap remains 
regarding what standard of probable cause is required for law 
enforcement to obtain a search warrant for suspected illegal marijuana 
cultivation.15  As the law stands, it is unclear what pieces of information 
law enforcement will need to provide in an affidavit to obtain a search 
warrant for marijuana cultivation in violation of The Act.  The purpose 
of this Note is to shed light on this gap by examining relevant marijuana 
case law from Massachusetts and Colorado to propose potential 
solutions to this imminent dilemma. 
This Note will first introduce and explore the recent marijuana 
reforms voted on in the 2016 election cycle and status of marijuana laws 
at the federal level in the United States.16  Second, it will examine the 
Massachusetts initiative, comparing and contrasting it to Colorado17—
the only state with similar marijuana cultivation laws to have analyzed 
the probable cause issue after implementing recreational marijuana.  
 
up to six marijuana plants per individual, with a max of twelve plants in a home) with COLO. 
CONST. art. XVIII, § 16, cl. 3(b) (2018) (legalizing the personal cultivation of up to six 
marijuana plants in the home, with three or fewer being mature) and WASH. ADMIN. CODE 
§ 314-55-075(1) (2018) (providing no express regulations legalizing the personal cultivation 
of marijuana in the home) and OR. REV. STAT. §§ 475B.245 (2018) (legalizing the personal 
cultivation of up to four marijuana plants per individual). 
13.  Alex Kreit, Symposium, Marijuana Legalization and Pretextual Stops, 50 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 741, 768–71 (2016) (discussing and examining issues in implementation of 
marijuana reforms and how they affect proactive police tactics). 
14.  The cultivation of marijuana in the home for distribution without a license remains 
illegal and a target for law enforcement.  The Act, supra note 6, at sec. 5, § 12(f). 
15.  Id.; supra text accompanying note 10. 
16.  Christopher Ingraham, An Unprecedented Number of States Will Vote on 
Marijuana This Fall, WASH. POST (Sept. 2, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
wonk/wp/2016/09/02/an-unprecedented-number-of-states-will-vote-on-marijuana-this-fall/ 
[hereinafter Ingraham, Unprecedented]. 
17.  COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, § 16, cl. 3(b). 
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Third, this Note will analyze what constitutes sufficient probable 
cause to search a home in Massachusetts in light of The Act.18  Fourth, 
this Note will explain how Colorado has handled probable cause issues 
regarding the search for suspected illegal marijuana cultivation and 
possession.  Finally, this Note proposes that Massachusetts should not 
adopt an approach similar to Colorado, but rather rely on local 
jurisprudence like Commonwealth v. Canning.19 
Personal marijuana cultivation is an emerging legal issue, with only 
a handful of states legalizing it since 2012.20  However, Massachusetts 
already has a body of settled marijuana jurisprudence it can rely on.21  
With the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) ruling in 
Canning, Massachusetts could look inward for guidance.22  This Note 
proposes that Canning does not significantly hamper law enforcement 
and provides a suitable framework for Massachusetts to transition 
toward legal cultivation of marijuana in the home.  Moreover, the subject 
of this Note’s inquiry is of special importance to safeguard the voters’ 
decision from zealous and hostile law enforcement practices. 
I. RECREATIONAL REFORMS IN 2016 ACROSS THE UNITED 
STATES AND THE STATUS OF MARIJUANA LAWS 
2016 was a pivotal year for marijuana reform and drug policy in the 
United States.23  More states than ever put marijuana reform to a 
statewide referendum.24  The results were an incredible display of 
democracy in action: California, Maine, Massachusetts, and Nevada 
legalized the recreational use of marijuana while Arizona voters rejected 
their measure.25 
 
18.  The Act, supra note 6, at sec. 5, § 7. 
19.  See generally Commonwealth v. Canning, 28 N.E.3d 1156 (Mass. 2015). 
20.  See generally German Lopez, The Spread of Marijuana Legalization, Explained, 
VOX (Jan. 22, 2018), https://www.vox.com/cards/marijuana-legalization/where-is-marijuana-
legal [https://perma.cc/5Z59-T6GJ]. 
21.  See generally Canning, 28 N.E.3d 1156; Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 37 N.E.3d 
611 (Mass. 2015); Commonwealth v. Cruz, 945 N.E.2d 899 (Mass. 2011). 
22.  See Canning, 28 N.E.3d at 1156 (requiring law enforcement to include proof that 
the target of search is not a registered medical marijuana grower in their application for a 
search warrant for illegal marijuana cultivation). 
23.  Ingraham, Unprecedented, supra note 16. 
24.  Id. 
25.  Christopher Ingraham, Marijuana Wins Big on Election Night, WASH. POST (Nov. 
8, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2016/11/08/medical-marijuana-
sails-to-victory-in-florida [Ingraham, Election Night]. 
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A. States That Legalized the Recreational Use of Marijuana 
In 2016 Alaska,26 California,27 Colorado,28 the District of 
Columbia,29 Maine,30 Massachusetts,31 Nevada,32 Oregon,33 and 
Washington34 have legalized the recreational use of marijuana.  The 
Department of Justice (DOJ) announced on August 29, 2013, that it 
would not seek to challenge the ballot initiatives in Washington and 
Colorado, which sought to legalize the recreational use of marijuana 
under state law.35  In the memo, the DOJ reaffirmed that marijuana 
 
26.  ALASKA STAT. § 17.38.020 (2017); Shelby Sebens, Legal Toking Still Months 




27.  CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.1 (West 2017); Katy Steinmetz, What to 
Know About Marijuana Legalization in California, TIME (Nov. 9, 2016), http://time.com/
4565438/california-marijuana-faq-rules-prop-64/ [https://perma.cc/98KH-MB8L].  For the 
text of the initiative as originally filed with the California Attorney General, see generally 
CONTROL, REGULATE AND TAX ADULT USE OF MARIJUANA ACT (Cal. 2016) (Dec. 7, 2015), 
https://www.oag.ca.gov/system/files/initiatives/pdfs/15-0103%20(Marijuana)_1.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/C9QF-JXV7]. 
28.  COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, § 16 (2018). 
29.  D.C. CODE § 48-904.01 (2015); Kathryn J. Russo, Oregon, Alaska, District of 
Columbia Legalize Recreational Marijuana, JACKSON LEWIS (Nov. 7, 2014), 
http://www.jacksonlewis.com/resources-publication/oregon-alaska-district-columbia-legalize-
recreational-marijuana [https://perma.cc/4AZB-2PAL]; Ian Simpson, Legal Marijuana Begins 
in Washington, D.C. As ‘Green Rush’ Is On, REUTERS (Feb. 26, 2015), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-marijuana-districtofcolumbia/legal-marijuana-begins-
in-washington-d-c-as-green-rush-is-on-idUSKBN0LU0CK20150227 [https://perma.cc/
7WYQ-ZVVV].  For the text of the initiative as originally published by the D.C. Board of 
Elections and Ethics, see generally LEGALIZATION OF POSSESSION OF MINIMAL AMOUNTS OF 
MARIJUANA FOR PERSONAL USE ACT OF 2014 (Mar. 25, 2014), https://www.dcboe.org/
pdf_files/pn_1587.pdf [https://perma.cc/BD6H-9YWY]. 
30.  ME. STAT. tit. 7 §§ 2441–54 (2017). 
31.  The Act, supra note 6, at sec. 5, § 7. 
32.  NEV. REV. STAT. § 453D.110 (2017).  For the text of the initiative as originally 
filed with the Nevada Secretary of State, see generally INITIATIVE TO REGULATE AND TAX 
MARIJUANA (2014), http://nvsos.gov/sos/home/showdocument?id=3294 [https://perma.cc/
8B53-9K96]. 
33.  OR. REV. STAT. §§ 475B.010–395 (2017).  For the text of the initiative as voted on, 
see generally CONTROL, REGULATION, AND TAXATION OF MARIJUANA AND INDUSTRIAL 
HEMP ACT (Or. 2014) http://www.oregon.gov/olcc/marijuana/documents/measure91.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/D5Z9-EW6W]; Sebens, supra note 26. 
34.  WASH. ADMIN. CODE §§ 314-55-005–540 (2017).  For the text of the initiative as 
originally filed, see generally INITIATIVE MEASURE NO. 502 (as filed July 8, 2011) 
https://www.sos.wa.gov//_assets/elections/initiatives/i502.pdf [https://perma.cc/433E-FBPC]. 
35.  See Memorandum from James M. Cole, Deputy Att’y Gen., to all U.S. Attorneys 
(Aug. 29, 2013) https://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/3052013829132756857467.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/92RH-B2SY] [hereinafter Cole Memo 2.0].  As this was the second  
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remains illegal under the Controlled Substance Act.36  Further, the DOJ 
stated that it expects state governments to establish and enforce strict 
regulations in their marijuana reforms to meet federal objectives.37  
However, on January 4, 2018, Attorney General Jefferson Beauregard 
Sessions III issued a memorandum to all U.S. Attorneys rescinding 
“previous nationwide guidance specific to marijuana enforcement”—
including the Cole Memo 2.0—thus pushing marijuana reform into 
greater uncertainty.38 
Most recently, on November 8, 2016, California, Maine, 
Massachusetts, and Nevada legalized the recreational use of marijuana.39  
California passed the Adult Use of Marijuana Act, which allows adults 
twenty-one and older to legally use, possess, transport, and purchase up 
to twenty-eight and a half grams of marijuana and eight grams of 
marijuana concentrates.40 
Maine passed a ballot question to legalize the purchase, non-public 
use, possession, and transportation of up to two and one-half ounces of 
marijuana in public for adults twenty-one and older.41  The law allows 
 
memorandum issued by the Deputy Attorney General on the subject, it is also known as “the 
Cole Memo 2.0.”  Scott H. Greenfield, The Cole Memo 2.0: This Changes Everything, SIMPLE 
JUST. (Aug. 30, 2013), https://blog.simplejustice.us/2013/08/30/the-cole-memo-2-0-this-
changes-everything/ [https://perma.cc/QXS9-F7LU]. 
36.  Greenfield, supra note 35.  See generally 21 U.S.C. § 802 (2016). 
37.  Cole Memo 2.0, supra note 35, at 1–2.  The DOJ identified eight federal objectives:  
Preventing the distribution of marijuana to minors; [p]reventing revenue from the 
sale of marijuana from going to criminal enterprises, gangs, and cartels; 
[p]reventing the diversion of marijuana from states where it is legal under state 
law in some form to other states; [p]reventing state-authorized marijuana activity 
from being used as a cover or pretext for the trafficking of other illegal drugs or 
other illegal activity; [p]reventing violence and the use of firearms in the 
cultivation and distribution of marijuana; [p]reventing drugged driving and the 
exacerbation of other adverse public health consequences associated with 
marijuana use; [p]reventing the growing of marijuana on public lands and the 
attendant public safety and environmental dangers posed by marijuana production 
on public lands; and [p]reventing marijuana possession or use on federal property. 
Id. 
38.  Memorandum from Jefferson Sessions, Att’y Gen., to all U.S. Attorneys (Jan. 4, 
2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1022196/download [https://perma.cc/
6N7F-NB5B]. 
39.  Ingraham, Unprecedented, supra note 16. 
40.  CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.1; Patrick McGreevy, California Vote to 
Legalize Recreational Use of Marijuana in the State, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 8, 2016), 
http://www.latimes.com/nation/politics/trailguide/la-na-election-day-2016-proposition-64-
marijuana-1478281845-htmlstory.html [https://perma.cc/SXC6-5U6A]. 
41.  See generally ME. STAT. tit. 7, §§ 2441–54 (2016). 
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residents to grow up to six cannabis plants at home.42  The law also 
creates a regulated marijuana retail sales system.43 
Massachusetts voters passed The Act, which legalized recreational 
marijuana for adults twenty-one and older.44  Adults may possess up to 
ten ounces of marijuana inside their homes.45  They may possess up to 
one ounce of marijuana in public.46  Additionally, they may grow up to 
six cannabis plants per person, with a maximum of twelve plants in a 
home.47  The law, which became effective December 15, 2016, restricts 
marijuana consumption to private locations.48  Distribution of marijuana 
without a license remains illegal.49 
Nevada voters approved a ballot measure that legalizes marijuana 
possession, consumption, and cultivation for adults twenty-one and 
older.50  The legislation also created a regulated marijuana retail sales 
system.51  The law became effective January 1, 2017.52 
Effective July 1, 2015, Oregon’s recreational marijuana law 
legalized the possession, use, and cultivation of limited amounts of 
marijuana by adults twenty-one and older.53  Adults twenty-one and 
older can legally possess up to eight ounces of marijuana and grow up to 
four marijuana plants in their households.54  Licenses are available for 
businesses approved to grow, produce, and purchase recreational 
 
42.  tit. 7, § 2452. 
43.  tit. 7, §§ 2441–54. 
44.  The Act, supra note 6, at sec. 5, § 7; Mass. Ballot Questions, supra note 6 (noting 
that 1,745,945 (53.6%) of registered Massachusetts voters voted “Yes” on Question 4, the 
legalization of marijuana, while 1,513,304 (46.4%) voted “No”). 
45.  The Act, supra note 6, at sec. 5, § 7(a)(2). 
46.  Id. at sec. 5, § 7(a)(1). 
47.  Id. at sec. 5, § 7(a)(2). 
48.  Id. at sec. 5, § 12(c).  While the recreational use, possession, and cultivation 
provisions of The Act went into effect on December 15, 2016, the provisions covering the 
taxation and commercial sale of marijuana were delayed by the legislature.  Kristin LaFratta, 
Massachusetts Gov. Charlie Baker Signs Marijuana Rewrite into Law, MASSLIVE (July 28, 
2017), http://www.masslive.com/news/boston/index.ssf/2017/07/
governor_baker_signs_massachus.html [https://perma.cc/KT54-HVMZ].  A compromise bill 
was reached, and Massachusetts Governor Charlie Baker signed the rewrite of the marijuana 
law in July 2017.  Id.  “The rewrite doesn’t change personal home-growing and possession 
limits that went into effect in December 2016.”  Id. 
49.  See generally The Act, supra note 6. 
50.  See NEV. REV. STAT. § 453D.110 (2017). 
51.  Id. 
52.  Id. 
53.  See OR. REV. STAT. §§ 475B.010–395 (2017); see also Sebens, supra note 26. 
54.  § 475B.245; Sebens, supra note 26. 
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marijuana.55  The law did not amend or affect the Oregon Medical 
Marijuana Act.56 
On November 4, 2014, voters in the District of Columbia57 and 
Alaska58 approved measures to legalize recreational marijuana.  The 
District of Columbia measure will allow individuals over the age of 
twenty-one to possess up to two ounces of marijuana and grow up to six 
marijuana plants at home.59  Since the District of Columbia is technically 
a district and not a state, the measure is subject to presidential and 
congressional approval.60  The final approval and implementation in the 
District of Columbia, however, remains unclear since federal law 
currently prohibits the possession of marijuana and its use.61 
In Alaska, only adults at least twenty-one years of age can legally 
possess, use, and grow limited amounts of marijuana.62  The initiative 
authorizes the Marijuana Control Board to regulate and license 
marijuana.63  Licenses are available for establishments who want to sell 
marijuana.64  The initiative prohibits driving while under the influence of 
marijuana.65 
In Washington, voters passed Initiative 502 on November 6, 2012.66  
Initiative 502 authorized the Washington State Liquor and Cannabis 
Board to regulate and tax marijuana distributed and possessed by 
individuals twenty-one and older.67  Additionally, the law added “a new 
threshold for driving under the influence of marijuana.”68  Licenses are 
 
55.  § 475B.040; Sebens, supra note 26. 
56.  § 475B.020(7); Sebens, supra note 26. 
57.  D.C. CODE § 48-904.01 (2015). 
58.  ALASKA STAT. § 17.38.020 (2017). 
59.  D.C. CODE § 48-904.01. 
60.  Russo, supra note 29; see also Simpson, supra note 29. 
61.  See generally Ams. for Safe Access v. DEA, 706 F.3d 438 (D.C. Cir. 2013). 
62.  ALASKA STAT. § 17.38.020 (2017).  Specifically, the initiative allows for  
possessing, using, displaying, purchasing, or transporting marijuana accessories or 
one ounce or less of marijuana; [and] possessing, growing, processing, or 
transporting not more than six marijuana plants, with three or fewer being mature, 
flowering plants, and possession of the marijuana produced by the plants on the 
premises where the plants were grown . . . . 
§ 17.38.020(1)–(2). 
63.  ALASKA STAT. § 17.38.080(a); see also Sebens, supra note 26. 
64.  ALASKA STAT. § 17.38.121(b); see Sebens, supra note 26. 
65.  ALASKA STAT. § 17.38.220(b); see Sebens, supra note 26. 
66.  INITIATIVE MEASURE NO. 502, supra note 34. 
67.  Id. at § 1; see also WASH. ADMIN. CODE §§ 314-55-005–540 (2017). 
68.  INITIATIVE MEASURE NO. 502, supra note 34, pt. 1, § 1.  If “the THC concentration 
of the driver’s blood is 5.00 or more” the individual’s “driver’s license, permit, or privilege to  
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available for establishments that were formed in Washington and for 
applicants twenty-one and older who have resided in Washington for 
three months.69 
Colorado amended its constitution to create a system that regulates 
marijuana according to a scheme similar to alcohol regulation.70  Only 
adults at least twenty-one years of age can legally consume or possess 
limited amounts of marijuana.71  Licenses are available for 
establishments wishing to sell marijuana.72  Notably, Colorado and 
Washington were the first states in the Union to legalize recreational 
marijuana use.73 
B. Status of Marijuana at the Federal Level 
While marijuana reform has swept across the Union, with more than 
half of the states approving some form of legalization, the drug remains 
illegal at the federal level.74  On October 19, 2009, Deputy Attorney 
General David Ogden issued a guiding memorandum regarding 
investigations and prosecutions in states with legal medical marijuana.75  
In 2013, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia rejected 
a petition to change marijuana from a Schedule I drug under the 
 
drive will be suspended, revoked, or denied for at least ninety days.”  Id. pt. 5, § (c)(2)(i); see 
also ADMIN. §§ 314-55-005–540. 
69.  INITIATIVE MEASURE NO. 502, supra note 34, pt. 3, § 6; see also ADMIN. §§ 314-
55-020(10). 
70.  COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, § 16 (2018). 
71.  Id.  Specifically, the amendment allows  
[p]ossessing, using, displaying, purchasing, or transporting marijuana accessories 
or one ounce or less of marijuana; [and p]ossessing, growing, processing, or 
transporting no more than six marijuana plants, with three or fewer being mature, 
flowering plants, and possession of the marijuana produced by the plants on the 
premises where the plants were grown, provided that the growing takes place in an 
enclosed, locked space, is not conducted openly or publicly, and is not made 
available for sale. 
Id. § 16 cl. 3(a)–(b). 
72.  Id. § 16. 
73.  Lopez, supra note 20. 
74.  21 U.S.C. § 812 (2016). 
75.  Memorandum from David Ogden, Deputy Att’y Gen., to Selected U.S. Attorneys 
(Oct. 19, 2009), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/legacy/2009/10/19/medical-
marijuana.pdf [hereinafter Ogden Memo] (Federal resources are not to be directed at 
“individuals whose actions are in clear and unambiguous compliance with existing state laws 
providing for the medical use of marijuana.”).  But see Memorandum from Jefferson Sessions, 
supra note 38 (rescinding all “previous nationwide guidance specific to marijuana 
enforcement” including the Ogden Memo). 
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Controlled Substances Act to a non-Schedule I drug76—the effect of 
which would have allowed for the possibility of federally authorized 
medical marijuana use with a prescription.77 
Additionally, in 2014, the U.S. House of Representatives passed an 
appropriations bill that contained the Rohrabacher-Farr Amendment 
restricting funds from the U.S. Department of Justice that would be used 
to prevent states from implementing their medical marijuana reforms.78  
One year later, the U.S. Senate approved the amendment and President 
Barack Obama signed it into law.79  While the amendment has proven an 
effective safeguard for the states, it has the potential to expire without 
renewal from Congress each fiscal year.80  Accordingly, the future of 
medical marijuana laws in the United States remains unclear. 
II. EXAMINATION OF THE MASSACHUSETTS INITIATIVE: 
COMPARING AND CONTRASTING IT TO COLORADO 
A. Massachusetts, The Act 
While seven states and the District of Columbia have legalized 
recreational marijuana in some form, only one state (Colorado) has had 
the opportunity to examine its probable cause to obtain a search warrant 
for suspected illegal marijuana cultivation in light of implemented 
 
76.  See generally Ams. for Safe Access v. DEA, 706 F.3d 438 (D.C. Cir. 2013). 
77.  Id. at 441 (“Unlike Schedule I drugs, federal law permits individuals to obtain 
Schedule II, III, IV, or V drugs for personal medical use with a valid prescription.”). 
78.  Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015, Pub. L. No. 113-
235, § 538, 2014 U.S.C.C.A.N. (128 Stat. 2130) 2217. 
None of the funds made available in this Act to the Department of Justice may be 
used, with respect to the States of Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, California, 
Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, 
Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, 
Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New 
Mexico, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, 
Washington, and Wisconsin, to prevent such States from implementing their own 
State laws that authorize the use, distribution, possession, or cultivation of medical 
marijuana. 
Id.  The amendment is named after its sponsors, Representatives Dana Rohrabacher and Sam 
Farr of California. 
79.  Steph Sherer, Congress Extends ‘Ceasefire’ on Medical Marijuana, but Can They 
Clear the Smoke?, HUFFPOST (Dec. 21, 2015) https://www.huffingtonpost.com/steph-sherer/
congress-extends-ceasefir_b_8853606.html [https://perma.cc/K4NJ-9X9L]. 
80.  Shira Schoenberg, Federal Protections for State Medical Marijuana Set to Expire 
Without Congressional Vote, MASSLIVE (Jan. 11, 2018), http://www.masslive.com/politics/
index.ssf/2018/01/federal_protections_for_state.html [https://perma.cc/X4WP-FBFZ]. 
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marijuana reform.81  Oregon issued its first retail marijuana license on 
October 1, 2016,82 but state courts have not had the opportunity to 
examine the issue of probable cause in light of their reform.  Washington 
legalized the recreational use of marijuana in 2014 but did not amend the 
criminal laws outlawing personal marijuana cultivation in the home.83  In 
D.C., voters passed recreational marijuana reforms; however, the 
complexity of the district not being a state has hindered 
implementation.84  For these reasons, The Act may only be effectively 
compared with Colorado’s Amendment 64.85 
The Act amended the state’s criminal law to permit the possession 
and cultivation of marijuana in the home of a person who is twenty-one 
years of age or older.86  Section 7 of the legislation covers the relevant 
personal use of marijuana.87  The legislation legalizes possession of up to 
ten ounces of marijuana and any marijuana produced by marijuana plants 
cultivated in the home for personal use.88  Additionally, it legalizes the 
possession, cultivation, and processing of up to six marijuana plants.89  
However, no more than twelve plants may be cultivated in any house at 
once.90  Finally, the distribution of marijuana without a proper license 
remains illegal under the legislation.91 
 
81.  See People v. Sexton, 296 P.3d 157, 162 (Colo. App. 2012) (examining the validity 
of a search warrant for illegal marijuana cultivation in light of legal medical marijuana 
cultivation); People v. Zuniga, 372 P.3d 1052, 1057 (Colo. 2016) (“[W]e now turn to the role 
that the odor of marijuana can play in the totality of circumstances test in light of the fact that 
possession of one ounce or less of marijuana is now allowed under Colorado law.”). 
82.  Oregon Begins Recreational Marijuana Sales on Saturday, FOX NEWS POLITICS 
(Oct. 1, 2016), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2016/10/01/oregon-begins-recreational-
marijuana-sales-on-saturday.html. 
83.  WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 314-55-075(1)(a).  Unlike the Colorado, Oregon, or 
Massachusetts recreational use legislation, Washington does not expressly allow the personal 
cultivation of marijuana in the home. 
84.  Russo, supra note 29; see also Simpson, supra note 29. 
85.  See COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, § 16 (2018). 
86.  The Act, supra note 6, at sec. 5, § 7(a)(2).  The Act specifically states,  
[W]ithin the person’s primary residence, possessing up to 10 ounces of marijuana 
and any marijuana produced by marijuana plants cultivated on the premises and 
possessing, cultivating or processing not more than 6 marijuana plants for 
personal use so long as not more than 12 plants are cultivated on the premises at 
once. 
Id. 
87.  Id. 
88.  Id. 
89.  Id. 
90.  Id. 
91.  Id. 
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B. Colorado Amendment 64 
Similar to The Act, Colorado’s Amendment 64 amended the state’s 
criminal law to allow the possession, growth, processing, and 
transportation of up to six marijuana plants.92  The amendment mandates 
that only three or fewer plants may be mature and flowering at one 
time.93  In 2012, Colorado voters decided to provide added security by 
limiting the area where marijuana may be cultivated in the home.94  Any 
marijuana must be cultivated in an enclosed, locked space, not in the 
open or in public.95  Additionally, akin to the legislation in 
Massachusetts, the distribution of marijuana without a license remains 
illegal in Colorado.96 
III. WITH LIMITED FORMS OF LEGAL MARIJUANA CULTIVATION, 
WHAT IS SUFFICIENT PROBABLE CAUSE TO SEARCH A HOME 
FOR ILLEGAL MARIJUANA CULTIVATION? 
In order to understand the concept of probable cause, we must first 
examine its source—the Fourth Amendment.97  The drafters of the 
Fourth Amendment in 1791 had two models for guidance.98  The first 
model came from Article X of the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776, 
which provided in relevant part: “[T]he people have a right to hold 
themselves, their houses, papers, and possessions free from search and 
seizure.”99  The second model came from the Massachusetts and New 
Hampshire Bills of Rights, which both provided in relevant part as 
follows: “Every subject has a right to be secure from all unreasonable 
searches[] and seizures.”100  John Adams, from Massachusetts, played a 
critical role in shaping the Fourth Amendment.101  His contributions to 
the Massachusetts Constitution would later serve as primary guidance in 
 
92.  COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, § 16, cl. 3(b) (2018). 
93.  Id. 
94.  Id. 
95.  Id. 
96.  Id. at § 16, cl. 1(b)(II). 
97.  U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
98.  See NORMAN J. SINGER & J.D. SHAMBIE SINGER, 2B Statutory Construction, in 
SUTHERLAND STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION §§ 51:1–3 (7th ed., rev. vol. 2013) 
(arguing that those who draft legislation are presumed to know the relevant existing law). 
99.  PA. CONST. of 1776, art. X, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/pa08.asp 
[http://perma.cc/VTY7-B4JG]. 
100.  MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. XIV; N.H. CONST. art. XIX. 
101.  Thomas K. Clancy, The Framers’ Intent: John Adams, His Era, and the Fourth 
Amendment, 86 IND. L.J. 979, 979–80 (2011). 
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the creation of the Fourth Amendment,102 which affirms 
[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.103 
The Fourth Amendment has traditionally been interpreted to contain 
two basic clauses.104  The first focuses on a reasonableness requirement 
to conduct searches and seizures.105  The second clause is commonly 
referred to as the warrant clause.106  Together, these two separate 
requirements amount to an individual’s rights under the Fourth 
Amendment.107 
A. The Implied Warrant Requirement 
Historically, there has been a general understanding by the Supreme 
Court that the warrant clause implies a warrant requirement.108  Under a 
strict interpretation, the warrant requirement dictates that “searches 
conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge 
or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment[,] 
subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated 
exceptions.”109  
 
102.  Id. (explaining how, while drafting the Fourth Amendment, James Madison 
adopted the outline used by John Adams in Article XIV of the Massachusetts Declaration of 
Rights and copied Adams’s language almost verbatim). 
103.  U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
104.  See generally Silas J. Wasserstrom, The Fourth Amendment’s Two Clauses, 26 
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1389 (1989). 
105.  Id. 
106.  Id. 
107.  U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
108.  See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967); Johnson v. United States, 
333 U.S. 10, 14–15 (1948).  “Belief, however well founded, that an article sought is concealed 
in a dwelling house furnishes no justification for a search of that place without a warrant.”  
Johnson, 333 U.S. at 14 n.4 (quoting Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 33 (1925)); 
Wasserstrom, supra note 104 at 1390 (“On the other view, the second clause helps explain the 
first; fourth amendment reasonableness turns on the presence of a validly issued warrant, 
except in certain [specified or] exceptional circumstances when it would not be feasible [for 
the police to obtain] one.”). 
109.  Katz, 389 U.S. at 357 (citations omitted).  These exceptions, called exigent 
circumstances, include emergency situations which require immediate action to prevent 
danger to life or serious damage to property, immediate action to prevent the imminent 
destruction of evidence, and the imminent escape of a fleeing suspect.  Missouri v. McNeely, 
569 U.S. 141, 149 (2013). 
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Prominent critics of the warrant requirement, such as former Justice 
Antonin Scalia, disagreed with this view and argued that there is nothing 
explicit in the text of the Fourth Amendment, nor its history, that 
supports the proposition of a warrant requirement.110  Further, critics 
question whether the warrant requirement effectively protects an 
individual’s rights under the Fourth Amendment.111  These critics argue 
that our Founding Fathers were highly skeptical of warrants in general 
and their subsequent immunity for law enforcement officials from 
common law remedies such as tort actions.112  Under this view, the 
Fourth Amendment is a reflection of this skepticism, requiring strict 
adherence to the limits set forth in a warrant and laying out the 
specific—but limited—circumstances where warrants may be issued.113  
Accordingly, interpreting a warrant requirement from the warrant clause 
of the Fourth Amendment would contradict the views of the Founding 
Fathers who sought to restrain their use.114  As the Court developed its 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, it has arguably followed this view and 
has recognized numerous exceptions which have effectively eroded the 
 
110.  See, e.g., California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 581 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) 
(“The Fourth Amendment does not by its terms require a prior warrant for searches and 
seizures; it merely prohibits searches and seizures that are ‘unreasonable.’”). 
111.  For an extensive critique of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence regarding the 
warrant clause and probable cause requirement, see Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment 
First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 761–81 (1994). 
112.  See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2494 (2014) (“Our cases have recognized 
that the Fourth Amendment was the founding generation’s response to the reviled ‘general 
warrants’ and ‘writs of assistance’ of the colonial era, which allowed British officers to 
rummage through homes in an unrestrained search for evidence of criminal activity.”); 
Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 581 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“For the warrant was a means of insulating 
officials from personal liability assessed by colonial juries.”); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 
616, 624–25 (1886); Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 
MINN. L. REV. 349, 399–401 (1974) (arguing that the drafters of the Bill of Rights were 
influenced by their experiences with an oppressive government); Thomas Y. Davies, 
Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REV. 547, 601–11 (1999).  “The 
historical record . . . reveals that the Framers focused their concerns and complaints rather 
precisely on searches of houses under general warrants [when drafting the Fourth 
Amendment].”  Id. at 601. 
113.  Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 581 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“What [the Fourth Amendment] 
explicitly states regarding warrants is by way of limitation upon their issuance rather than a 
requirement of their use.”); Richard Posner, Rethinking the Fourth Amendment, 1981 SUP. CT. 
REV. 49, 72 (1981) (“The natural reading is not that the Framers wanted to encourage the use 
of warrants but that they wanted to discourage their use by imposing stringent requirements on 
their issuance.”). 
114.  Posner, supra note 113, at 73 (“The use of the magistrate as a shield against 
liability would be the opposite of what the draftsmen of the warrant clause intended.”). 
378 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:363 
warrant requirement.115 
Issues regarding the warrant requirement have risen as the country 
has entered the digital era where law enforcement has increased access 
to modern surveillance and data aggregation technologies,116 such as 
stingrays,117 Global Positioning System (GPS) devices,118 and cell-site 
tracking.119  While several Justices have addressed this issue—
specifically regarding the public observation120 doctrine—and whether to 
 
115.  Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 582 (Scalia, J., concurring) (outlining the warrant as 
“basically unrecognizable” due to all the exceptions recognized by the Court); United States v. 
Place, 462 U.S. 696, 721 (1983) (Blackmun, J., concurring); Craig M. Bradley, Two Models of 
the Fourth Amendment, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1468, 1475 (1985) (describing how there are more 
searches performed today based on an exception to a warrant than pursuant to a warrant); Silas 
J. Wasserstrom & Louis Michael Seidman, The Fourth Amendment as Constitutional Theory, 
77 GEO. L.J. 19, 34 (1988) (citation omitted) (“[T]he rule is now so riddled with exceptions, 
complexities, and contradictions that it has become a trap for the unwary.”). 
116.  See, e.g., Marc Jonathan Blitz, The Fourth Amendment Future of Public 
Surveillance: Remote Recording and Other Searches in Public Space, 63 AM. U. L. REV. 21, 
48–67 (2013); David Gray & Danielle Citron, The Right to Quantitative Privacy, 98 MINN. L. 
REV. 62, 103–25 (2013) (“Today, the risk of a surveillance state arises with law enforcement’s 
unfettered access to advanced surveillance technologies, including aerial drones, GPS-enabled 
tracking devices, and data aggregation and mining projects.”); Orin S. Kerr, The Mosaic 
Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 111 MICH. L. REV. 311, 338–39 (2012) (“[T]he most 
challenging and important threshold question in interpreting the Fourth Amendment is what 
[surveillance] counts as a ‘search’”); Paul Ohm, The Fourth Amendment in a World Without 
Privacy, 81 MISS. L.J. 1309, 1332 (2012) (“[E]ven if we increase probable cause and warrant 
requirements, we still will be subject to far too much arbitrary surveillance.”); Christopher 
Slobogin, Making the Most of United States v. Jones in a Surveillance Society: A Statutory 
Implementation of Mosaic Theory, 8 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 16–28 (2012). 
117.  See, e.g., Ellen Nakashima, Secrecy Around Police Surveillance Equipment 
Proves a Case’s Undoing, WASH. POST (Feb. 22, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/
world/national-security/secrecy-around-police-surveillance-equipment-proves-acasesundoing/
2015/02/22/ce72308a-b7ac-11e4-aa05-1ce812b3fdd2_story.html?hpid=z1 [https://perma.cc/
7XLM-XP82] (describing how a stingray, a cell-tower simulator, operates).  “The StingRay is 
a box about the size of a small suitcase—there’s also a handheld version—that simulates a cell 
phone tower.”  Id. 
118.  See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404 (2012) (holding that, under the 
Fourth Amendment, the government’s use of a GPS tracking device on the defendant’s vehicle 
constituted a search). 
119.  Id. at 413–18 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (explaining new methods of surveillance 
which rely on electronic signals); id. at 426–30 (Alito, J., concurring) (explaining how 
technological advances, especially in cell phone technology, influence the expectations of 
privacy when programs gather location data from a phone).  Massachusetts grappled with the 
issue in Commonwealth v. Augustine, 35 N.E.3d 688, 693 n.9 (Mass. 2015) (citing 
Commonwealth v. Augustine, 4 N.E.3d 846 (Mass. 2014)) (“[A]n individual has no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in his or her [cell site location information], and therefore 
the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment does not apply.”). 
120.  The public observation doctrine holds that where law enforcement make an 
observation from a public place or from a place where they are legally allowed to be, there is 
no search under the Fourth Amendment.  See Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 449–50 (1989)  
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rein these technologies into Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, no 
consensus has formed surrounding the implications of these issues on the 
warrant requirement.121  Effectively, this lack of consensus has left the 
door open to law enforcement to investigate and collect information 
from suspects using advanced technologies and methods that fall outside 
the warrant requirement.122  In the context of marijuana cultivation 
specifically, helicopters,123 drones,124 night vision goggles, as well as 
utility records are available and widely used.125 
B. State Law Governing the Existence of Probable Cause and What Is 
Needed to Obtain a Warrant in Massachusetts 
In Massachusetts, there is well-established law detailing what is 
required of law enforcement to obtain a warrant to search a house or 
dwelling for suspected criminal activity.126  Under Massachusetts law, an 
 
(holding that law enforcement did not conduct a search under the Fourth Amendment where 
they observed marijuana cultivation from a helicopter because they were in a public airway); 
Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 239 (1986) (“We hold that the taking of aerial 
photographs of an industrial plant complex from navigable airspace is not a search prohibited 
by the Fourth Amendment.”); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 215 (1986); United States 
v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281–82 (1983) (“A person traveling in an automobile on public 
thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to 
another.”). 
121.  See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2495 (2014) (“Our answer to the question 
of what police must do before searching a cell phone seized incident to an arrest is accordingly 
simple[,] get a warrant.”).  However, the Court left open the question of how the warrant 
requirement will be affected by technological changes.  See Jones, 565 U.S. at 426–30 (Alito, 
J., concurring).  “In circumstances involving dramatic technological change, the best solution 
to privacy concerns may be legislative.”  Id. at 429.  See also Augustine, 35 N.E.3d at 690 
(examining whether cell site location information collected without a warrant supported the 
issuance of a search warrant for suspected arson). 
122.  See, e.g., Riley, 488 U.S. at 449–50 (holding that where law enforcement make an 
observation in a public place, like a helicopter, there is no search and therefore no need to 
acquire a warrant). 
123.  See, e.g., id. 
124.  Phil Mattingly, FBI Uses Drones in Domestic Surveillance, Mueller Says, WASH. 




125.  Commonwealth v. Canning, 28 N.E.3d 1156, 1159 (Mass. 2015) (noting that law 
enforcement may rely upon previously obtained electric utility records and observations made 
using night vision goggles to support their application for a search warrant for illegal 
marijuana possession and cultivation). 
126.  See generally MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 276 §§ 1–2C (2017); Commonwealth v. 
Upton, 476 N.E.2d 548 (Mass. 1985); Commonwealth v. Smith, 348 N.E.2d 101 (Mass. 
1976); Commonwealth v. Von Utter, 246 N.E.2d 806 (Mass. 1969); Commonwealth v.  
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affidavit to establish the probable cause to obtain a warrant must comply 
with state statutory requirements as well as satisfy the requirements of 
the United States Constitution and Supreme Court decisions.127  An 
affidavit in support of a search warrant must be strictly scrutinized and 
will only be held “valid where the underlying circumstances presented to 
the issuing judge or clerk clearly demonstrate probable cause to search 
the named premises and to believe that all persons present are involved 
in the criminal activity afoot.”128  Accordingly, an affidavit including 
purely conclusory information is an insufficient basis to obtain a search 
warrant.129  Instead, law enforcement must clearly show the underlying 
facts which give rise to their belief that probable cause exists.130 
Additionally, to establish probable cause, an affidavit must show the 
source of the information, the reliability of the source, and the nature of 
the information.131  Law enforcement may include hearsay statements as 
a basis to establish probable cause, so long as the statement also includes 
support for their belief in the credibility of the informant and reliability 
of the information.132  Information obtained during a surveillance period 
is acceptable to support an affidavit for probable cause.133 
However, the SJC has declined to follow the Supreme Court’s 
decisions regarding the requisite information in an affidavit.134  In 
circumstances where the outcome of a decision would violate the 
 
Causey, 248 N.E.2d 249 (Mass. 1969); Commonwealth v. Cuddy, 231 N.E.2d 368 (Mass. 
1967). 
127.  See U.S. CONST. amend. IV; MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. XIV; MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 
276 § 2B; Upton, 476 N.E.2d at 554 (quoting Commonwealth v. Cinelli, 449 N.E.2d 1207, 
1216 (Mass. 1983)) (An “affidavit must ‘contain enough information for an issuing magistrate 
to determine that the items sought are related to the criminal activity under investigation, and 
that they reasonably may be expected to be located in the place to be searched.’”); 
Commonwealth v. Cefalo, 409 N.E.2d 719, 726 (Mass. 1980) (“In the case of a search 
warrant, as distinguished from an arrest warrant, the affidavit must . . . contain enough 
information . . . to determine that the items sought are related to the criminal activity under 
investigation, and that they may reasonably be expected to be located in the place to be 
searched.”); Causey, 248 N.E.2d at 249. 
128.  Smith, 348 N.E.2d at 107. 
129.  Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 239 (1983); Cuddy, 231 N.E.2d at 370. 
130.  See Von Utter, 246 N.E.2d at 809; Commonwealth v. Penta, 225 N.E.2d. 58, 61 
(Mass. 1967). 
131.  Von Utter, 246 N.E.2d at 809; Causey, 248 N.E.2d at 251. 
132.  See Commonwealth v. Moran, 228 N.E.2d. 827, 829 (Mass. 1967); 
Commonwealth v. Rossetti, 211 N.E.2d 658, 660 n.4 (Mass. 1965). 
133.  See Commonwealth v. Guerro, 260 N.E.2d 190, 197–98 (Mass. 1970). 
134.  Commonwealth v. Depiero, 42 N.E.3d 1123, 1126 (Mass. 2016) (rejecting the 
adoption of the 9-1-1 system as an independent indicator of reliability for an anonymous tip 
reasoning that it would violate Article 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights). 
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Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, the SJC has declined to follow the 
Court.135 
C. The Current Standard of Probable Cause for Suspected Illegal 
Cultivation of Marijuana in Massachusetts 
In Canning, the SJC set the most current standard of probable cause 
for illegal marijuana cultivation to obtain a search warrant in 
Massachusetts.136  Police officers in Canning obtained a facially valid 
search warrant upon a showing of probable cause for illegal marijuana 
possession and cultivation.137  However, the District Court and the SJC 
took issue with the fact that the affidavit failed to establish that the target 
of the warrant was not registered under HMUM to legally cultivate 
marijuana in the home.138 
The officers based their probable cause upon a tip from a 
confidential informant, their own surveillance of the property, training, 
and experience.139  A confidential informant told police that the 
defendant was living at the property and was involved in a marijuana 
grow operation.140  Law enforcement observed obscured windows, 
aluminum hoses protruding from a window, a pickup truck in the 
driveway registered to the defendant, a strong odor of freshly cultivated 
marijuana emanating from the house, and the sound of fans operating.141  
Furthermore, while using night vision goggles, officers saw light 
emanating from another window at the property in question.142  
Additionally, police from another town informed law enforcement that 
they had observed the defendant and another man purchasing a large 
 
135.  See, e.g., id. 
136.  Commonwealth v. Canning, 28 N.E.3d 1156, 1166 (Mass. 2015). 
Detective Kent’s affidavit filed in support of the search warrant in this case did not 
contain any information at all addressing whether the defendant was or was not 
registered as a qualifying patient or personal caregiver to grow the marijuana the 
police reasonably suspected was growing on the property.  Nor, as the motion 
judge observed, did it contain other facts or qualified opinions that might supply 
an alternate basis to establish the necessary probable cause to believe the 
cultivation was unlawful.  As such, the affidavit failed to establish probable cause 
for the search. 
Id. (internal citation omitted). 
137.  Id. at 1158. 
138.  Id. at 1165. 
139.  Id. at 1159. 
140.  Id. 
141.  Id. 
142.  Id. 
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amount of indoor marijuana grow materials from a hydroponic shop and 
loading the equipment into the defendant’s pickup.143 
Law enforcement also obtained utility bills relating to the electrical 
service of the property and other houses nearby.144  The records showed 
that the average kilowatt usage for the neighboring three homes were 
542.3 kilowatt hours (kWh), 23.3 kWh, and 246.6 kWh, while the 
average kilowatt usage for the defendant’s property was 3116.5 kWh.145  
Based on their training, law enforcement was aware that the cultivation 
of marijuana required different types of electrical equipment including 
high intensity discharge lamps, fluorescent lights, and sophisticated 
irrigation and ventilation systems to be constantly operating, and 
therefore high usage of electricity was expected.146 
The officers searched the defendant’s property and seized 
approximately 1.2 pounds of marijuana, seventy marijuana plants, and 
other marijuana cultivation paraphernalia.147  The defendant was 
subsequently arrested and filed a motion to suppress the seized evidence 
along with the statements he made at the time of the search and his 
arrest.148  The motion was granted by a District Court judge who 
concluded that the search warrant affidavit “establishe[d] probable cause 
that marijuana was being cultivated indoors at the defendant[’]s home, 
but [also] concluded in substance that in light of [HMUM] the affidavit 
failed to establish probable cause that the cultivation was [illegal under 
HMUM].”149  The SJC affirmed the order.150 
Canning is particularly useful for the transition to legal marijuana 
cultivation in the home because it details exactly what law enforcement 
needs in order to establish probable cause.151  Confidential informants 
and observations made during surveillance (for example: kWh, 
observations of equipment being used, training, and personal experience) 
can be included in an affidavit to support the existence of probable 
cause.152  These various methods will in no way be hindered with the 
legalization of personal marijuana cultivation in a home.  
 
143.  Id. 
144.  Id. 
145.  Id. 
146.  Id. 
147.  Id. 
148.  Id. 
149.  Id. (alterations in original). 
150.  Id. at 1166. 
151.  Id. at 1159. 
152.  Id. 
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The SJC, in deciding Canning, laid out a standard which 
Massachusetts law enforcement would need to satisfy in order to obtain 
a search warrant for suspected illegal marijuana cultivation in light of 
legal medical marijuana cultivation.153  Specifically, Canning establishes 
that a supporting affidavit to establish probable cause must also show 
how the target owning or in control of the property is not registered 
under the HMUM to cultivate the marijuana at issue.154  In order to 
determine whether this standard is appropriate for the legalization of 
personal cultivation of marijuana in the home in Massachusetts, we must 
examine how Colorado has approached the issue. 
IV. HOW COLORADO HAS APPROACHED LEGAL MARIJUANA 
CULTIVATION IN THE HOME 
Since Colorado has had a chance to examine its probable cause 
analysis in light of its implemented marijuana reforms, Massachusetts 
may look to Colorado for guidance.  To determine whether 
Massachusetts should adopt a similar approach, we must examine the 
probable cause analysis that the courts in Colorado have utilized 
regarding marijuana cultivation in the home. 
In Colorado, the courts have established a “totality of the 
circumstances” test for probable cause.155  Specifically, in Mendez v. 
People, the court reasoned that the analysis of probable cause under both 
the state and federal constitutions requires judges to look at the totality 
of the circumstances.156  “[J]udges, considering all of the circumstances, 
 
153.  Id. at 1165. 
154.  Id. 
This is not to say that such an affidavit always must contain facts directly 
establishing that the person whose property the police seek to search for evidence 
of unlawful marijuana cultivation is not or probably not registered to do so; 
reasonable inferences may be drawn that a suspected marijuana cultivation 
operation is unlawful from other facts.  For example, except for registered medical 
marijuana treatment centers, it remains unlawful to cultivate marijuana for sale.  
Facts indicating that a confidential informant recently purchased marijuana from 
the owner of the property where the cultivation operation is suspected to be taking 
place would likely supply the requisite probable cause to search that property for 
evidence of unlawful cultivation, as would information that police recently had 
observed marijuana plants growing on the property and that, in the opinion of a 
properly qualified affiant, the number of plants exceeded the quantity necessary to 
grow a sixty-day supply of ten ounces. 
Id. at 1165 n. 15. 
155.  Mendez v. People, 986 P.2d 275, 280 (Colo. 1999) (citing People v. Turcotte-
Schaeffer, 843 P.2d 658, 660 (Colo.1993)). 
156.  Id. 
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must make a practical, common sense decision whether a fair probability 
exists that a search of a particular place will reveal contraband or 
evidence of a crime.”157  Finally, the information necessary to satisfy a 
finding of probable cause does not need to rise to the level of 
certainty.158 
In People v. Sexton, the Court of Appeals for Colorado examined a 
case where the Pueblo County sheriff’s office were conducting 
investigations looking for illegal marijuana cultivation in rural parts of 
the area.159  Part of the investigation included an aerial marijuana 
eradication program where trained officers used helicopters to spot 
clandestine marijuana grow operations.160  During one of these public 
observations via helicopter, a detective observed the defendant’s 
marijuana grow operation.161  He then directed ground officers to the 
location to contact anyone who may be there.162  After the officers did 
not find any one, they sought to obtain a search warrant for the property 
based on the marijuana cultivation they observed.163 
Upon issuance of the search warrant, the detective entered the 
property.164  At that time, he observed a piece of paper attached to a 
plywood board on a tree that stated the marijuana cultivation was for 
medical purposes for “Colorado Compassion Club’s certified members 
(‘garden certificate’).”165  The detective stated that the garden certificate 
had places for ten members’ numbers and several places for caregivers’ 
signatures and information.166  However, the detective determined that 
“relevant information was missing or, where filled out, illegible.”167  He 
then discussed the garden certificate with the other officers participating 
in the search and contacted the district attorney’s office to discuss the 
situation.168  Nevertheless, because officers observed 128 marijuana 
plants—grossly exceeding the legal plant limit for medical marijuana—
 
157.  Id. (citing People v. Altman, 960 P.2d 1164, 1167 (Colo. 1998)). 
158.  Id. (“The probable cause standard does not lend itself to mathematical certainties 
and should not be laden with hypertechnical interpretations or rigid legal rules.”). 
159.  People v. Sexton, 296 P.3d 157, 159 (Colo. App. 2012). 
160.  Id. 
161.  Id. 
162.  Id. 
163.  Id. 
164.  Id. 
165.  Id. 
166.  Id. 
167.  Id. 
168.  Id. 
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the officers proceeded to pull up all the plants to eradicate them.169 
After the officers completed the eradication, the defendant arrived at 
the property.170  He presented the officers with a notebook that contained 
medical marijuana registration cards for several patients, some of whom, 
himself included, had doctor recommendations to grow extra marijuana 
plants.171  Regardless, the officers seized the eradicated plants.172  Upon 
drying out, officers separated the leaves from the stalks of the plant to 
obtain an accurate weight.173  The total weight of the leaves was 20.4 
pounds.174 
The defendant was subsequently charged with illegal marijuana 
cultivation and possession.175  At trial, his primary defense was that the 
marijuana cultivation was legal pursuant to the Colorado Constitution.176  
While the jury acquitted the defendant of cultivation, they found him 
guilty of possession.177  In response, the defendant appealed asserting, 
among other things, that the search warrant lacked veracity and that 
probable cause was absent.178 
In addressing the defendant’s assertion, the court first determined 
that any trespass on the property by law enforcement to confirm that the 
plants were marijuana was “immaterial to the validity of the warrant 
because the allegations of possible illegal activity in the affidavit were 
based solely on the detective’s aerial observations.”179 
Second, the court rejected the argument that the affidavit in support 
of the warrant was defective on the basis that it omitted previous 
misidentifications because the detective had fifteen years of experience 
and training in identifying marijuana cultivation.180 
 
169.  Id. 
170.  Id. 
171.  Id. 
172.  Id. 
173.  Id. 
174.  Id. 
175.  Id. 
176.  Id. 
177.  Id. 
178.  Id. 
179.  Id. at 162; see also supra text accompanying note 120. 
180.  Sexton, 296 P.3d at 162 (citing People v. Leftwich, 869 P.2d 1260, 1265–66 
(Colo. 1994) (holding that in reviewing an affidavit, the magistrate considers the totality of the 
circumstances, including the affiant’s relevant experience and training, knowledge at the time 
he or she wrote the affidavit, and the veracity and basis of knowledge of anyone supplying 
hearsay information); People v. Kerst, 181 P.3d 1167, 1171 (Colo. 2008) (“A fact is material 
for the purposes of vitiating an entire affidavit only if its omission rendered the affidavit  
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Third, the court rejected the defendant’s argument that the affidavit 
only described a possible, rather than a confirmed, marijuana cultivation 
operation.181  The court found that the detective’s experience and 
training in locating marijuana grow operations provided a substantial 
basis for concluding that probable cause existed.182 
Fourth, the court rejected the defendant’s argument that the affidavit 
only concluded that the cultivation was only “potentially” illegal under 
existing marijuana law, holding that it did not undermine the finding of 
probable cause.183  The court reaffirmed that “[o]fficers need not ‘refrain 
from searching premises under circumstances in which the activity in 
question could potentially be legal,’ as long as the circumstances also 
support a reasonable belief that evidence of illegal activity will be 
found.”184 
As the court of appeals rejected each argument by the defendant 
regarding a lack of probable cause, and rejected his other arguments 
raised, the judgment by the jury was affirmed.185  The Colorado Supreme 
Court denied the defendant’s subsequent writ of certiorari to review the 
court of appeals decision.186 
The Colorado Supreme Court has continually held steadfast to the 
“totality of the circumstances” approach to probable cause since the 
legalization of recreational marijuana.187  In People v. Zuniga, a 
Colorado State Trooper stopped a Jeep Cherokee on an interstate 
highway.188  As “the trooper approached the vehicle’s open, passenger-
side window he quickly noted a ‘heavy odor’ of ‘raw’ (i.e. unburnt) 
marijuana.”189  The trooper proceeded to question the driver and 
 
‘substantially misleading’ as to the existence of probable cause to the magistrate who issued 
the warrant.”)). 
181.  Id. 
182.  Id. (citing People v. Gutierrez, 222 P.3d 925, 937 (Colo. 2009) (holding that 
probable cause is not a precise calculation based on certainties, but rather a reasonable belief 
based on probabilities); People v. Mapps, 231 P.3d 5, 7–8 (Colo. App. 2009) (holding the 
same); People v. Pacheco, 175 P.3d 91, 94 (Colo. 2006) (“A court reviewing the validity of a 
search warrant does not engage in de novo review but rather examines whether the magistrate 
had a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed.”)). 
183.  Id. 
184.  Id. (citing Mendez v. People, 986 P.2d 275, 281 n.4 (Colo. 1999); United States v. 
Naugle, 997 F.2d 819, 823 (10th Cir. 1993); Kerst, 181 P.3d at 1172). 
185.  Id. 
186.  Id. 
187.  People v. Zuniga, 372 P.3d 1052, 1054 (Colo. 2016); Mendez, 986 P.3d at 280; 
Sexton, 296 P.3d at 162. 
188.  Zuniga, 372 P.3d at 1054. 
189.  Id. 
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defendant.190  Based on their inconsistent stories, his observations of 
“their extreme nervousness, and the strong odor of raw marijuana, the 
trooper” became suspicious that criminal activity was afoot.191  He 
proceeded to have his “K-9 unit . . . conduct a ‘free air sniff’ around the 
vehicle.”192  The canine “quickly alerted at the rear hatch of the Jeep 
Cherokee.”193  As a result, the trooper searched the hatch and found a 
large duffel bag with one pound of marijuana and a cooler with “12.6 
ounces of marijuana concentrate under . . . ice.”194  Upon finding the 
marijuana, the trooper asked the defendant if it was his, to which the 
defendant responded, “Yes, sir.”195  The defendant was subsequently 
arrested and “charged . . . with two counts of possession with intent to 
manufacture or distribute marijuana or marijuana concentrate.”196 
“The trial court . . . found that because possession of one ounce or 
less of marijuana [was] allowed under Colorado law, the odor of 
marijuana [could not] contribute to a determination of probable 
cause.”197  The Supreme Court of Colorado disagreed with the reasoning 
of the trial court, relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in Florida v. 
Harris.198  The Supreme Court of Colorado decided that, according to 
the Supreme Court, the totality of the circumstances test for probable 
cause is an “all-things-considered approach,” and its “ultimate 
touchstone” is reasonableness.199  The Colorado Supreme Court found 
that their established precedent was “consistent with the principle that, 
while a possible innocent explanation may impact the weight given to a 
particular fact in a probable cause determination, it does not wholly 
eliminate the fact’s worth and require it to be disregarded.”200  Therefore, 
the court held that “the odor of marijuana is relevant to the totality of the 
circumstances test and can contribute to a probable cause determination” 
in light of the legalization of recreational use in Colorado.201 
 
190.  Id. at 1055. 
191.  Id. 
192.  Id. 
193.  Id. 
194.  Id. 
195.  Id. 
196.  Id. 
197.  Id. at 1057. 
198.  Id. at 1058 (citing Florida v. Harris, 568 U.S. 237, 243–44 (2013)). 
199.  Id. at 1058 (citations omitted). 
200.  Id. at 1059. 
201.  Id.; cf. Commonwealth v. Cruz, 945 N.E.2d 899, 910 (Mass. 2011). 
Given our conclusion that [MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 94C §§ 32L–32N] has changed 
the status of possessing one ounce or less of marijuana from a crime to a civil  
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Under the decisions in Sexton, Mendez, and Zuniga, Colorado has 
established a method to determine probable cause in light of the 
legalization of recreational marijuana.  Accordingly, Massachusetts has 
guidance available from Colorado to set a standard to determine 
probable cause to search a home for suspected illegal marijuana 
cultivation since passage of The Act. 
V. MASSACHUSETTS SHOULD NOT ADOPT COLORADO’S 
APPROACH, AND INSTEAD SHOULD RELY ON LOCAL CASE LAW 
As Colorado has had the opportunity to examine the probable cause 
analysis since implementation of recreational marijuana, Massachusetts 
may look toward their approach for guidance in implementation of The 
Act.  That said, Massachusetts should only adopt an approach from 
Colorado that would benefit its implementation and conform with settled 
law.  Therefore, we must determine whether the Colorado approach 
would conflict with established Massachusetts jurisprudence. 
A. Effect of Adopting the Colorado Approach 
Massachusetts and Colorado have both entered uncharted legal 
territory respectively in their states regarding the cultivation of 
marijuana in the home.  Colorado allows the cultivation of up to six 
marijuana plants, while Massachusetts allows up to double that 
number.202  Additionally, Massachusetts and Colorado are distinct from 
one another because of their jurisprudence regarding marijuana and the 
probable cause analysis.203  The Massachusetts Constitution contains 
distinct standards to establish probable cause of criminal activity to 
obtain a warrant.204  Further, the decision in Canning heightened the 
standard of probable cause more than any requirement established by 
 
violation, without at least some other additional fact to bolster a reasonable 
suspicion of actual criminal activity, the odor of burnt marijuana alone cannot 
reasonably provide suspicion of criminal activity to justify [an order to exit the 
vehicle]. 
Cruz, 945 N.E.2d at 910 (emphasis added) (emphasis omitted). 
202.  Compare COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, § 16, cl. 3(b) (2018) (allowing the cultivation 
of up to six marijuana plants in a home), with The Act, supra note 6, at sec. 5, § 7 (allowing 
the cultivation of up to twelve plants in a home limited to six for processing). 
203.  Compare Commonwealth v. Canning, 28 N.E.3d 1156, 1158 (Mass. 2015), and 
Cruz, 945 N.E.2d at 910 (finding the odor of marijuana irrelevant to the probable cause 
analysis), with Zuniga, 372 P.3d at 1052 (finding the odor of marijuana relevant to the 
probable cause analysis). 
204.  MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. XIV; MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 276, §§ 1–2C. 
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Colorado courts or legislation.205  Specifically, Canning imposes a 
requirement on law enforcement to include sufficient information in 
their affidavit to show how the target of the search is not registered 
under the medical marijuana program to cultivate.206  Conversely, in 
People v. Sexton, the Court of Appeals for Colorado, when faced with a 
similar set of facts (suspected illegal marijuana cultivation in lieu of 
medical marijuana), determined that no such extra step is required.207 
Furthermore, Colorado uses a “totality of the circumstances” 
analysis to establish probable cause, unlike Massachusetts.208  In fact, the 
SJC has expressly rejected the “totality of the circumstances” test.209  
Moreover, under a “totality of the circumstances” test, the courts in 
Colorado may take into consideration the odor of marijuana to determine 
probable cause, which Massachusetts courts have also expressly 
rejected.210  Adoption of a “totality of the circumstances” test would 
conflict with the Massachusetts Constitution as stated in Upton.211  
Accordingly, Colorado marijuana jurisprudence is too distinct from 
 
205.  Compare Canning, 28 N.E.3d at 1166 (finding that a search warrant for illegal 
marijuana cultivation was defective since it did not include information to show that the target 
was not registered under the HMUM), with Sexton, 296 P.3d at 162 (finding that a warrant for 
illegal marijuana cultivation that did not include information to show that the target was 
registered under the medical marijuana program was valid). 
206.  Canning, 28 N.E.3d at 1166. 
207.  Sexton, 296 P.3d at 162. 
208.  Mendez, 986 P.2d at 280 (establishing a totality of the circumstances test for 
probable cause to search for marijuana possession).  “Hence, we hold that the odor of 
marijuana is relevant to the totality of the circumstances test and can contribute to a probable 
cause determination.”  Zuniga, 372 P.3d at 1059. 
209.  Commonwealth v. Upton, 476 N.E.2d 548, 556 (Mass. 1985) (rejecting the 
“totality of the circumstances” test from Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983), finding it 
“unacceptably shapeless and permissive”) (quoting Commonwealth v. Upton, 458 N.E.2d 717, 
724 (Mass. 1983)).  “The Federal test lacks the precision that we believe can and should be 
articulated in stating a test for determining probable cause.”  Id.  “We conclude that art. 14 
provides more substantive protection to criminal defendants than does the Fourth Amendment 
in the determination of probable cause.”  Id. 
210.  Compare Zuniga, 372 P.3d at 1059 (finding the odor of marijuana relevant to the 
probable cause analysis), with Cruz, 945 N.E.2d at 899 (finding the odor of marijuana 
irrelevant to the probable cause analysis), and Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 37 N.E.3d 611, 
620 (Mass. 2015). 
Because stops based on reasonable suspicion of a possible civil marijuana 
infraction do not promote highway safety and run contrary to the purposes of 
[MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 94C, § 32L], we are disinclined to extend the rule that 
allows vehicle stops based on reasonable suspicion of a civil motor vehicle offense 
to stops to enforce the civil penalty for possession of one ounce or less of 
marijuana. 
Rodriguez, 37 N.E.3d at 620. 
211.  Upton, 476 N.E.2d at 556. 
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Massachusetts and would contradict with Massachusetts law.  Therefore, 
Massachusetts should not adopt the Colorado approach to establish 
probable cause of illegal marijuana cultivation to obtain a search warrant 
because it would erode existing state precedent. 
B. Massachusetts Should Look Inward and Rely on Local Precedents 
like Commonwealth v. Canning 
In Canning, the Commonwealth argued that limitations imposed on 
law enforcement following this decision would be impossible to 
overcome.212  However, the requirement for police imposed in Canning 
does not overwhelmingly hamper or limit law enforcement efforts.213  
Although there are requisite extra steps, as this Note214 and the court in 
Canning both discuss, traditional methods of obtaining probable cause 
still exist.215  As law enforcement evidenced in Canning, the continued 
use of computer services and advanced equipment like night vision 
goggles remain available.216  Furthermore, the restrictions imposed by 
Canning are not too restrictive as technology to assist law enforcement 
continues to grow.217  Additionally, because the distribution of marijuana 
remains illegal, law enforcement may avoid having to prove that the 
individual is not registered under HMUM if they can show probable 
cause of distribution of marijuana without a license.218 
Finally, the SJC properly considered the will of the voters and intent 
of the legislature in deciding Canning.219  Following the same reasoning, 
The Act makes it clear that its intent is to protect individuals from 
 
212.  Commonwealth v. Canning, 28 N.E.3d 1156, 1166 (Mass. 2015). 
213.  Id. (“We disagree with the Commonwealth that the result we reach imposes an 
impossible burden on police to search for elusive and difficult-to-locate information about 
whether a person suspected of growing marijuana is registered to do so.”). 
214.  See discussion supra Subpart III.B. 
215.  Canning, 28 N.E.3d at 1159 (outlining the traditional methods used by law 
enforcement to obtain probable cause in the affidavit submitted by Detective Kent in support 
of the warrant application). 
216.  Id. at 1159. 
217.  See generally Gray & Citron, supra note 116 (examining the growing 
technologies available to law enforcement in the digital era). 
218.  Id. at 1165 n.15. 
219.  The SJC concluded “the [HMUM]’s provisions make it abundantly clear that its 
intent is to protect the lawful operation of the medical marijuana program established by the 
legislation from all aspects of criminal prosecution and punishment, including search and 
seizure of property as part of a criminal investigation.”  Id. at 1165 (emphasis added) (citing 
An Act for the Humanitarian Medical Use of Marijuana, 2012 Mass. Acts ch. 369, §§ 1, 3–6 
https://malegislature.gov/Laws/SessionLaws/Acts/2012/Chapter369 [https://perma.cc/52RZ-
URPL]). 
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prosecution for legal recreational marijuana use.220  The voters’ will is at 
least an indication that the people of Massachusetts do not consider 
recreational marijuana use a serious criminal offense.221  Accordingly, 
the public interest will arguably be better served if law enforcement 
redirects their drug task force resources to more important crises facing 
the Commonwealth.222 
CONCLUSION 
Marijuana reforms are rapidly spreading across the United States.223  
In the twenty-first century, the majority of states and the District of 
Columbia have passed some form of marijuana reform.224  If these trends 
continue, it will not be long before each state in the Union has passed 
some form of marijuana reform.  State legislatures, Congress, and the 
executive branch should continue to respect the intent of citizens to 
change marijuana laws in the United States.225 
The issue regarding legal cultivation of marijuana in the home is a 
novel one for Massachusetts, and much of the United States.  However, 
Massachusetts has a large body of settled law related to marijuana.226  
Rather than adopt the approach from Colorado, which has already 
implemented legalized personal marijuana cultivation in the home,227 
 
220.  “[A] person 21 years of age or older shall not be arrested, prosecuted, penalized, 
sanctioned or disqualified under the laws of the commonwealth in any manner, or denied any 
right or privilege and shall not be subject to seizure or forfeiture of assets for [legal 
recreational use.]”  The Act, supra note 6, at sec. 5, § 7. 
221.  Id. 
222.  For example, the opioid crisis in Massachusetts is one of the worst in the country.  
See generally Evan Horowitz, Heroin, Prescription Opioids Form Especially Toxic Mix in 
Mass., BOS. GLOBE (May 2, 2016), https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2016/05/01/heroin-
and-prescription-opioids-form-especially-toxic-mix-mass/WejrwoaMOjM1vQFD9ov2GK/
story.html (“The Massachusetts heroin epidemic is unlike any other in the United States.”); 
Matt Rocheleau, Opioid Overdose Deaths by Mass. Town in 2015, BOS. GLOBE (May 3, 
2016), https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2016/05/03/map-opioid-overdose-deaths-mass-
town/Ckn7zRuySCj7WYZWKqbvjI/story.html (“The opioid crisis has hit Massachusetts hard, 
particularly in some communities. . . . [Two hundred twenty-one] of the state’s 351 cities and 
towns had at least one overdose death in 2015.”). 
223.  Ingraham, Unprecedented, supra note 16; supra Part I. 
224.  Ingraham, Election Night, supra note 25. 
225.  See Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act 2015, Pub. L. No. 
113-235, § 538, 128 Stat. 2130, 2217 (2014); Cole Memo 2.0, supra note 35, at 1; Ogden 
Memo, supra note 75, at 1.  But see Memorandum from Jefferson Sessions, supra note 38. 
226.  See generally Commonwealth v. Canning, 28 N.E.3d 1156 (Mass. 2015); 
Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 37 N.E.3d 611 (Mass. 2015); Commonwealth v. Overmyer, 11 
N.E.3d 1054 (Mass. 2014); Commonwealth v. Cruz, 945 N.E.2d 899 (Mass. 2011). 
227.  COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, § 16 cl. 3(b) (2018). 
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Massachusetts should look inward.  A “totality of the circumstances” 
approach would erode and conflict with state precedent.228  Therefore, 
Massachusetts should stand steadfast with local precedents like Canning 
in order to provide a fair and just transition to legal personal marijuana 
cultivation in the home. 
 
228.  See Canning, 28 N.E.3d at 1156; Rodriguez, 37 N.E.3d at 611; Cruz, 945 N.E.2d 
at 899; Commonwealth v. Upton, 476 N.E.2d 548, 556 (Mass. 1985). 
